This paper discusses the reasons for Brazil"s high policy real interest rates by considering two opposing views, the orthodox and heterodox approaches. While orthodox authors defend the position that bad domestic policies are the cause of the high interest rate, heterodox economists claim that the international financial system and orthodox policies influence the level of the policy rate in Brazil. The aim of this study is to assess whether the proposed arguments can be supported when comparing Brazilian real interest rates with other developing countries under the same monetary regime. The conclusion is that, although the orthodox and heterodox arguments are both intuitively plausible, when comparing stylized facts and testing the hypotheses econometrically neither is sufficient to elucidate the Brazilian case. The paper concludes by suggesting that there might be political causes of the high real interest rates in Brazil such as a politically influential rentier class. 
Introduction
The high central bank interest rate in Brazil has been under discussion for a long time in academia and society in general. Although some economists defend interest-rate setting as a purely technical mechanism, monetary policy is constantly under dispute between workers, firms and rentiers. In order to privilege workers and firms, the former Worker"s Party government implemented direct attempts to reduce the central bank real interest rate in 2012/13. However, the policy has failed and the country has again raised real policy rates to a level much higher than other similar economies. Therefore, the debate on central bank interest rates and its effects has sparked again in the country, and existing economic theories that seek to explain the phenomenon shall be examined in this paper. Table 1 shows that Brazil"s central bank real interest rate (CBRIR) is among the highest in the world 1 . While Brazil has an average of 8.14% over the period 1996-2015, the corresponding time average for a group of selected countries, including Brazil, is only 1.85%. The extraordinarily high real interest rates of Brazil mean that the country is prone to lower investment rates, reduced growth, increasing public indebtedness and rising income inequalities. Therefore, the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) has been trying to reduce policy rates since the implementation of inflation targeting policies in 1999. Although there has been a clear declining trend of policy rates, Brazil has not been able to reduce its CBRIRs to a comparable level with the rest of the world. One could argue that, since the country follows the inflation targeting (IT) framework, the central bank needs to respond to accelerating inflation with raising interest rates. However, Brazil does not have inflation rates much higher than other similar economies under inflation targeting regimes, as we can see in Table 2 . Therefore, economists debate other aspects besides inflation that could explain this discrepancy. Mainstream economists find low saving (Hausmann 2008; Lara Resende 2011; Segura-Ubiergo 2012) , the history of sovereign debt default (Reinhart and Rogoff 2004; Salles 2007) , strong capital controls (Arida 2003; Arida et al. 2003) and weak domestic institutions (Bacha et al. 2009; Gonçalves et al. 2007; World Bank 2006) to be important causes of the phenomenon. Heterodox economists, on the other hand, claim that high exchange rate volatility (Arestis et al. 2008; Sicsú 2002) as well as high exchange rate pass-through (Baltar 2015; Ono et al. 2005) are important determinants of the high CBRIR in
Brazil. In addition, they argue that, since the country has cost-push inflation due to its indexed prices and high exchange rate pass-through, interest rate policy is not the appropriate tool to control inflation (Modenesi and Modenesi 2012; Oreiro et al. 2012; Summa and Serrano 2012) . In combination with conservative interest rate-setting, this induces the BCB to keep on raising its policy rate without succeeding in reducing inflation, thus pushing CBRIR up (Modenesi 2011) .
The paper provides an original systematic review and empirical test of the proposed explanations by mainstream and heterodox authors. It assesses the determinants of CBRIRs through stylized facts and econometric evidence. The study will thus contribute to the existing literature by providing evidence for proposed theoretical explanations, which could be used to formulate a more precise theory of the determinants of real interest rates in Brazil.
The main finding of the paper is that the orthodox and heterodox theories are not sufficient to explain the high CBRIR in Brazil.
The paper is structured as follows: the second section discusses mainstream and heterodox explanations for high Brazilian CBRIRs and provides an empirical comparison between
Brazil and other developing countries under the IT framework. Section 3 presents an econometric analysis of the determinants of CBRIRs for eleven countries from 1996 to 2015.
The last section concludes.
How do mainstream and heterodox economists explain the high policy rate in

Brazil?
In this section, I review the mainstream and heterodox arguments for CBRIRs in Brazil, and present some comparative empirical evidence in order to provide a first reality check of the proposed determinants.
Mainstream explanations
Mainstream economists consider the high real interest rates in Brazil to be a puzzle (Bacha et al. 2009, p.343; Segura-Ubiergo 2012) . Four main arguments have been put forth to explain the phenomenon: lack of saving, a high risk premium, high convertibility risk and jurisdictional uncertainty 3 .
Lack of saving
According to mainstream economists, the CBRIR is high because there is a lack of saving in Brazil Lara Resende 2011; Lopes 2014; Segura-Ubiergo 2012) . This argument is based on the loanable funds theory in which the equilibrium between the supply of saving and the demand for investment in the market for loanable funds determines the equilibrium interest rate (Mishkin 2014, p.78) . Although it is acknowledged that short-term interest rates are set by the central bank, it is argued that the central bank rate cannot deviate from the natural rate of interest given by loanable funds market equilibrium without compromising price stability. Lopes (2014, p. 3) disaggregates saving into three components: private saving, government saving and external saving. Private saving corresponds to domestic firms and household saving, while government saving corresponds to the budget surplus, and external saving to the commercial deficit, i.e. the surplus in the capital and financial account (Lara Resende 2011, p.1-2). It is argued that private saving is low in Brazil because the high marginal tax rate affects mostly firms and households with high propensities to save, whereas most of the transfers are made to households with a low propensity to save, such as pensioners and poor individuals (Hausmann 2008, p.27) . At the same time, government saving is also low in Brazil, although public investment is the lowest compared to other developing countries. The explanation given for low public saving is thus the considerable weight of pension transfers, high interest rates on public debt and strong government consumption (ibid, p.23). Those factors would thus explain why domestic saving rates are lower in Brazil than in other countries, thus pushing central bank interest rates up, according to mainstream authors (Segura-Ubiergo 2012, p.7). Table 3 depicts gross domestic saving rates as a share of GDP for our sample of seven developing countries that follow an inflation targeting regime. It is possible to see that Brazil has a higher saving-to-GDP ratio in comparison with its peers. For instance, Brazil showed higher rates than Colombia until 2010, South Africa after 2001 and the Philippines for the entire sample period. Thus, the stylized facts do not support the saving gap argument. (Hausmann, 2008; Lopes, 2014; Segura-Ubiergo, 2012) , lack of central bank independence Favero and Giavazzi, 2002; Nahon and Meurer, 2009; Segura-Ubiergo, 2012) and high debt-to-GDP ratio Favero and Giavazzi, 2002; Gonçalves et al., 2007; Muinhos and Nakane, 2006; Segura-Ubiergo, 2012) . However, because of unavailability of data, these mechanisms could not be considered. 
High default risk premium
A second mainstream argument is that due to Brazil"s history of sovereign defaults the country must pay a high default risk premium (Segura-Ubiergo 2012, p.5). In this view, a "country"s risk of default on external debt, together with its inflation history […] provides a good measure of a country"s capacity to bear debt without brooking high risk of default"
(ibid, p.54). For being a serial defaulter, Brazil is bound to receive less capital inflow from rich countries (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) , which means that the country must take action to attract capital. Thus, the high government default risk would be captured by a higher central bank interest rate.
The sovereign default of our selected countries is shown in Table 4 . In the sample, Brazil had seven sovereign debt problems in the 1980s and five debt problems in the 1990s. However, in the 1980s Chile and the Philippines presented the same number of sovereign default events as Brazil and in the 2000s Indonesia had two years of default while Brazil had none. Therefore, this explanation also has weak empirical support. This result is consistent with Salles"s (2007, p.5) argument that the history of inflation and default is common ground for all Latin American countries, thus not justifying the substantially higher Brazilian CBRIR. 
Convertibility risk
A further argument is that the convertibility of the Brazilian Real is considered very restrictive. As clarified by Gonçalves et al. (2007, p.62) , this argument is not related to pegged exchange rate regimes, but to capital controls, i.e. any restrictions to convert local currency into foreign currency. Some examples of capital controls that impose restrictions on foreign investments by Brazilian residents are: the prohibition of big institutional investors such as pension funds to invest abroad, the high level of bureaucracy that increases compliance costs and, lastly, a requirement of previous authorization from the BCB to transfer large amounts abroad (Arida et al. 2003, p.12) . As a result, mainstream authors argue that foreign lenders would be very cautious in providing funds to Brazilian residents as there would be a high risk that residents would not be able to repay their loans. Thus, lenders would increase their interest rates in foreign currency because of the convertibility risk. The higher interest rates on foreign loans would also push domestic interest rates up (Arida 2003 ).
An empirical investigation by Gonçalves et al. (2007) finds only a weak relation between capital controls and interest rates in Brazil. Table 5 is not possible to conclude that this is a strong cause of the Brazilian higher real interest rate, which is also confirmed by the time series in Gonçalves et al. (2007) . 
Jurisdictional uncertainty
Regarding institutional aspects, we find the so-called jurisdictional uncertainty hypothesis.
According to this hypothesis, the institutions of a particular country are determinants of interest-rate setting ). The theory is based on the fact that there is no domestic market for long-term credit and bonds (Gonçalves et al. 2007, p.55) either in Real or foreign currency, but there is a possibility for the Brazilian government, big firms and large banks to receive foreign credit denominated in foreign currency (Arida et al. 2003, p.4) . The lack of a domestic credit market is due to uncertainties related to Brazilian jurisdiction. One example of jurisdictional uncertainty would be the risk created by the government, since it could modify financial contracts at any time, such as through surprise inflation, asset confiscation and direct lending policies -as it has done in the past. Therefore, investors would demand a premium for a possible future loss. The other example relates to the lack of legal rights for creditors and a legal system that systematically benefits debtors (World Bank 2006, p.26) . Moreover, in this view, there is an anti-creditor bias reflected in the common Brazilian opinion that the creditor has a negative connotation and opposes itself to the debtor, which in contrast is regarded as the productive capital that is able to generate jobs and output (Arida et al. 2003, p.6) . In this respect, the uncertainty related to Brazilian jurisdiction would then require from the central bank the setting of a higher interest rate to attract foreign capital. Bacha et al. (2009, p.347 ) quantify the jurisdictional uncertainty through the rule-of-law index from the World Bank to estimate its impact on interest rates in Brazil, but find no relation between the two variables. In the same way, Gonçalves et al. (2007) use the rule-oflaw and regulatory quality as proxies for jurisdictional uncertainty, but find no relationship between the variables and interest rates. Table 6 deals with the jurisdictional uncertainty argument. Following the work of Gonçalves et al. (2007) , I use the rule-of-law variable as a proxy for jurisdictional uncertainty. Rule-of-law is an estimation of the confidence that agents have in law enforcement and legal stability, especially in the "quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence" (World Bank database definition). It is captured by an index ranging from minus 2.5 to 2.5 units in a standard normal distribution. As we can see, many countries such as Colombia, Indonesia and the Philippines have a similar or worse rule-of-law index than
Brazil. Thus, the empirical evidence does not support this mechanism. To sum up, mainstream economists provide four key explanations for why the policy real interest rate in Brazil is higher than in other countries which are summarized in Table 7 . They refer to the lack of saving, the country"s history of default on external lenders, the level of capital controls and the intrinsic risk of the national institutions. Yet, the analysis of the stylized facts shows that those arguments are not supported by evidence when comparing the Brazilian results with other developing countries under the IT regime. 
Heterodox explanations
Heterodox economists also provide several explanations for the high interest rates in Brazil.
Two key arguments are related to the effect of the exchange rate on inflation. Moreover, heterodox economists believe that the application of incorrect monetary policies and the conservative approach of the BCB are also strong factors for the high CBRIR in Brazil 4 .
Exchange rate volatility
The first argument of the heterodox approach is that the high volatility of the exchange rate has a strong connection with the high interest rates (Sicsú 2002, p.132; Oreiro et al. 2012, p.576) . According to Carneiro and Rossi (2013, p.6) , "international investors demand a premium which takes the form of an increase in the nominal interest rate to compensate for the risk of moving to an unstable currency". This argument stems from the Keynesian assumption that every asset has a liquidity premium, that is, a value for its convenience and security, which is included in the final rate of return on this asset (Keynes 2003 (Keynes [1936 , p.143). Considering national currencies as assets, the more convenient and secure the currency, the lower its interest rate will be. Herr (2008, p.129 ) calls this phenomenon currency premium, in which "each currency in the world earns a specific non-pecuniary rate of return" that represents its respective qualities. This concept is also present in Conti et al. (2014, p.355-356) , who elaborate the determinants of the domestic interest rate under this aspect.
In Table 8 , the volatility of the nominal exchange rate for selected countries can be compared 5 . Although Brazil does show a strong volatility, other countries" exchange rates are also unstable, such as the Indonesian and the South African ones. Therefore, this argument seems not to be a sufficient explanation for the high CBRIRs in Brazil. 
Exchange rate pass-through
Furthermore, heterodox authors highlight the effects of strong exchange rate pass-through in Brazil. The high exchange rate pass-through means that in the case of a currency devaluation there is a strong effect in the domestic price level. Consequently, the BCB is forced to increase the nominal interest rate to contain the increase in general prices (Ono et al. 2005, p.241) . A high exchange rate pass-through is a second channel through which exchange rate volatility may affect the CBRIR, according to heterodox authors. Since exchange rate volatility changes the expected inflation rate, the monetary authority might be unable to meet the previously established target (Arestis et al. 2008, p.26) . According to Barbosa-Filho (2015, p.414) , by adopting an interval of tolerance of 2 percentage points, the BCB can adjust the target according to the exchange rate variations. In this case, exchange rate volatility is able to explain most of the changes in inflation in Brazil since the IT implementation. This is supported by an empirical study by Oreiro et al. (2012) that shows that the variation in the exchange rates is the main determinant of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and central bank interest rate in the country.
The measurement of exchange rate pass-through for each country in the sample is beyond the scope of this paper. However, empirical evidence shows that Brazil does not have a higher pass-through than its peers. Baqueiro et al. (2003, p.349) found that, for Colombia, the country has an exchange rate pass-through coefficient between 0.77 and 2.56. Extending the model to Brazil, Silva and Vernengo (2008, p.69-70) find the exchange rate pass-through coefficient in Brazil to be between 0.02 and 0.91, which is much lower than the Colombian equivalent. Thus, although it is possible that exchange rate variation has a positive effect on inflation in Brazil, this cannot be the only explanation for the high real interest rates.
Cost-push inflation
Heterodox economists do not assume that inflation is only a matter of pressures from aggregate demand. The increase in prices can also occur on the supply-side, due to so-called cost-push inflation. This phenomenon can derive from an increase in rents (Wray 1997) , indexation of administrated prices (Summa and Serrano 2012) , devaluation of the national currency (Serrano 2010 ), but mostly from aspirations of workers or capitalists (Rochon and Rossi 2006, p.9; Smithin 1994, p.99) . Also known as conflict inflation, this latter type of increase in prices takes place because, by demanding higher wages or establishing higher profits, there is an increase in costs of production. Therefore, the distributional conflict between workers and capitalists can push prices up (Lavoie 2014 Summa and Serrano (2012, p.8) shows that average administrated price inflation has been higher than total average price growth during the 2000s. This study corroborates the hypothesis that the indexation of administered prices has a strong effect on inflation in Brazil. Moreover, there is an "amplifying effect" of monitored prices. For instance, exchange rate fluctuations have a greater effect on those prices than free-price goods or services (Oreiro et al. 2012, p.566) . Serrano (2010, p.68) affirms that these fluctuations first impact monitored prices, which are later passed on to freeprice goods. Thus, inflation in Brazil could not be reduced by increasing interest rates and, by trying so, the BCB keeps on raising interest rates beyond the international level.
Empirically, the indexation of prices as a factor of increasing central bank interest rates is difficult to compare due to lack of data. Although Brazil has a high indexation level, as discussed above, other countries also exhibit the same issue. In Colombia, for instance, regulated prices of electricity, gas, water and sewage are indexed to the previous inflation level, while fuel and transport services adjust prices according to costs (Vargas et al. 2009, p.137) . Moreover, López (2008, p.24) affirms that, although showing a declining trend in relative prices with respect to free-priced goods, administered prices in Colombia have a higher annual variation than the latter. They also have a large impact on total inflation, when considering its relative size in the basket of goods. Therefore, administered-price indexation is a feature not only of the Brazilian economy. Since Colombia exhibits a much lower CBRIR than Brazil, this explanation can also be regarded as insufficient.
Monetary policy conservatism
Considering the political aspect of the IT framework, Oreiro et al. (2012, p.563) claim that the BCB has an excessive concern about the inflation rate. To confirm this argument, Modenesi (2011, p.427-428) shows that the BCB has an extremely conservative reaction function: it sets the interest rate higher than necessary to fight inflation and it reduces the rate only very slowly when actual inflation is below the target. This "slow to ease, quick to hike" philosophy has been adopted by other inflation-targeting central banks as well (Bibow 2013, p.623) . In fact, under disinflation or economic deceleration is it likely that the BCB interest rate will remain unchanged (Modenesi 2011, p.428) . Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002, p.9) econometrically test the causality between CPI inflation and inflation targeting. For Brazil, they do not find any causality, probably due to the small sample period or the fact that the country already had low inflation rates when adopting the IT framework. For Chile, however, they conclude that CPI inflation caused the setting of the inflation target and consider this finding to be consistent with the argument that the Central Bank of Chile was conservative during the setting of its targets in the 1990s. In that way, Brazil seems not to be the only country in which the Central Bank sets conservative targets to reduce inflation, but still keeps higher CBRIR.
To conclude, heterodox economists believe that the BCB"s interest rate policy has another purpose beyond controlling inflation directly: to control exchange rate volatility due to high exchange pass-through. Moreover, due to an incorrect diagnosis of the causes of inflation, the BCB is unable to reduce inflation effectively. Therefore, the interest rate ends up being set at a much higher level than it should be. A summary of heterodox arguments can be found in Table 9 . Chile also implemented conservative targets in the 1990s
No
As we can see, the stylized facts show us the fragility of the current analyses for the case of Brazil. However, in order to test for the general explanatory power of each argument, I will use an econometric analysis to investigate whether those could be relevant in a context of developing countries under the IT regime. Moreover, the econometric analysis will provide evidence on country-specific characteristics that are not captured by the existing explanations.
Econometric analysis of the determinants of central bank real interest rates
This (1)
Where CBRIR is the central bank real interest rate, α i is the fixed effect of each country, SAV is gross domestic saving as share of GDP, RULE is the rule-of-law index, KCONTR is an index for overall restrictions to inflow and outflow of assets and XVOL is the volatility of nominal bilateral exchange rates with respect to the U.S. dollar. IT is a dummy variable for the years in which the country was under the inflation targeting framework (0 is not under IT and 1 is under IT), FED is the effective federal funds rate of the United States (US) and GDP is the GDP growth rate 6 .
The first three variables are derived from mainstream theory. SAV is the saving rate of the economy which, according to the loanable funds theory, is expected to exert a negative effect on the CBRIR. RULE is a proxy for jurisdictional certainty. A better ranking in the rule-of-law index is expected to have a negative impact on CBRIR because it implies lower risk for creditors. Mainstream authors further argue that capital controls constitute convertibility risk for foreign investors that is being compensated by a higher interest rate. KCONTR is thus expected to have a positive effect on CBRIR.
The variables XRVOL and IT capture arguments that have been put forth by heterodox authors. XVOL is expected to have a positive impact on CBRIR because it leads to a lower quality of the currency, which is assumed to be compensated by a higher interest rate premium. Heterodox authors further argue that since monetary policy is a largely ineffective tool to control inflation, inflation targeting will lead to higher and higher policy rates as long as the true causes of inflation remain untouched. Therefore, IT is expected to exert a positive effect on CBRIR.
Lastly, FED and GDP are added as control variables. It has been argued that in a financially globalized world, US monetary policy influences policy rates in the rest of the world through speculative capital movements (Rey 2016) . FED is thus expected to have a positive effect on CBRIR. Moreover, output growth is expected to impact on monetary policy setting insofar as the output gap is an argument of the central bank reaction function. We would, therefore, expect GDP to exert a positive effect on CBRIR.
6 Appendix A displays detailed information on these variables. CBRIR it = α i + β 1 CBRIR it-1 + β 2 SAV it-1 + β 3 RULE it-1 + β 4 KCONTR it-1 + β 5 XRVOL it + β 6 IT it-2 + β 7 FED t-2 + β 8 GDP it-1 + ɛ it
The description of variables is the same as in equation (1) Group Estimator (MG) with robust standard errors that allows for heterogeneous slope coefficients across group members and corrects for cross-sectional dependence. Lastly, I
apply a regression using the first difference of both dependent and explanatory variables with robust standard errors as to account for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The specifications are described in Table 10 , while the results are shown in Table 11 . As it is possible to notice, no explanatory variable is statistically significant across all specifications. Except for the estimations using first differences, the IT regime dummy variable is statistically significant in most specifications and has a negative effect on CBRIR.
In the first specification, for instance, implementing the IT framework reduces CBRIR by about 5.2 percentage points on average two years later. Thus, there is some evidence that the IT framework reduced the CBRIR in the sample. This result is at odds with the argument that the IT framework is beneficial for the rentier class as a whole as made by Epstein (1992 Epstein ( , 2002 and Papadatos (2009) -at least for developing countries. This is a puzzling finding that may warrant further research. Apart from IT no other variable is statistically significant in more than one specification. Therefore, none of the other explanatory variables can be considered robust.
As a final robustness check, I redo the ADL method with fixed-effects and robust standard errors, and successively remove the variables with the lowest t-value until only statistically significant variables remain, which turn out to be CBRIR it-1 and IT it-2 , thus confirming previous findings. In conclusion, the results show that the proposed explanations for CBRIR determination in developing countries under IT cannot obtain strong econometric support. The weak performance of the explanatory variables points to the relevance of omitted variables that are partly captured by the country-specific constants. A closer look at the country-specific constant also shows whether Brazil still exhibits a significantly higher CBRIR after controlling for other factors. Table 12 displays the country-specific constants of the sample obtained from specification (1). Another method would be to estimate capital flight as a proxy for the pressure of rentiers with respect to reductions in the CBRIR in each country and compare the results. In this case, if a decrease in CBRIR would have a stronger effect on capital outflows from Brazil than other countries, ceteris paribus, it could be concluded that the rentier class is able to easily transfer its capital, thus possessing a strong bargaining power. However, the required data would first have to be originally collected for the countries of interest, which would constitute a promising research project for the future.
Conclusion
This Currently facing a severe recession together with accelerating inflation, Brazil needs to reconsider its policies of high real interest rates, which seem to be ineffective in bringing down inflation. Thus, the country needs to adopt alternative measures to deal with inflation, while at the same time considering the distributive policies that must take place to stimulate growth and provide social justice.
Appendix A: Description of variables used in the model (1) and (2) 
